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Abstract
Background Within (European) healthcare systems, the predominant goal for pharmaceutical expenditure is cost contain-
ment. This is due to a general belief among healthcare policy makers that pharmaceutical expenditure—driven by high 
prices—will be unsustainable unless further reforms are enacted.
Objective The aim of this paper is to provide more realistic expectations of pharmaceutical expenditure for all key stakeholder 
groups by estimating pharmaceutical expenditure at ‘net’ prices. We also aim to estimate any gaps developing between list 
and net pharmaceutical expenditure for the EU5 countries (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK).
Methods We adjusted an established forecast of pharmaceutical expenditure for the EU5 countries, from 2017 to 2021, 
by relecting discounts and rebates not previously considered, i.e. we moved from ‘list’ to ‘net’ prices, as far as data were 
available.
Results We found an increasing divergence between expenditure measured at list and net prices. When the forecasts for the 
ive countries were aggregated, the EU5 (unweighted) average historical growth (2010–2016) rate fell from 3.4% compound 
annual growth rate at list to 2.5% at net. For the forecast, the net growth rate was estimated at 1.5 versus 2.9% at list.
Conclusions Our results suggest that future growth in pharmaceutical expenditure in Europe is likely to be (1) lower than 
previously understood from forecasts based on list prices and (2) below predicted healthcare expenditure growth in Europe 
and in line with long-term economic growth rates. For policy makers concerned about the sustainability of pharmaceutical 
expenditure, this study may provide some comfort, in that the perceived problem is not as large as expected.
Key Points for Decision Makers 
Pharmaceutical policy is sometimes driven by limited 
data.
Our aim was to ill an important gap in the diference 
between list and net pharmaceutical expenditure in the 
EU5 and describe how that diference might evolve in 
the near future.
Available data indicate that the list versus net pharma-
ceutical expenditure gap is signiicant and increasing.
Our results suggest that pharmaceutical expenditure is 
under control, below predicted healthcare expenditure 
growth in Europe, and in line with long-term economic 
growth rates.
 * Jorge Mestre-Ferrandiz 
 jormesfer13@gmail.com
Extended author information available on the last page of the article
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1 Introduction
European healthcare systems are under pressure to manage 
rising healthcare costs associated with changing demo-
graphics, rising patient expectations, and the launch of 
new, premium-priced medicines (and healthcare technolo-
gies more generally) addressing areas of unmet need. A 
seminal paper on the drivers of healthcare costs pointed 
to ‘innovation’ as the major cost driver; this was consid-
ered more important than demographics [1]—bearing in 
mind that the analysis focused on the US healthcare mar-
ket, which is signiicantly diferent from that in Europe. 
Within (European) healthcare systems, the predominant 
goal for pharmaceutical expenditure is cost contain-
ment, with a tendency to adopt a ‘silo mentality’ and 
separately consider expenditure on particular healthcare 
resources, in this case pharmaceuticals [2]. According to 
the most recent Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) data (2018), pharmaceutical 
expenditure accounts for between 11.4% (UK) and 19.1% 
(Spain) of total healthcare expenditure across the ive larg-
est European drug markets, i.e. France, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and the UK (the EU5) [3]. This proportion in the 
EU5 has fallen slightly since 2008, largely due to both 
cost-containment mechanisms imposed after the global 
inancial crash and to a wave of patent expiries [3]. How-
ever, it is worth noting the limitations in the OECD data 
(discussed in Sect. 4), such as excluding drugs used in 
inpatient settings in some countries (although Italy does 
include that data) and including over-the-counter products; 
overall, total pharmaceutical expenditure should be higher.
There is a general belief among healthcare policy mak-
ers that pharmaceutical expenditure—driven by high 
prices—will be unsustainable in future unless further 
reforms are enacted. A recent OECD initiative on access 
to innovative pharmaceuticals and sustainability of phar-
maceutical expenditure stated that “high prices compro-
mise patient access and put an unsustainable strain on 
healthcare budgets” [4, 5]. The same premise underlies the 
recent European Council conclusions on “strengthening 
the balance in the pharmaceutical systems in the European 
Union and its Member States” [5].
While this concern is widespread, there is a lack of 
agreement about what constitutes a ‘sustainable’ rate of 
growth for pharmaceutical expenditure and a paucity of 
forecasts of future growth rates upon which to inform pol-
icy making in Europe. We were unable to identify any pub-
lished forecasts from governmental bodies, at either Euro-
pean or member state levels, that predict pharmaceutical 
expenditure from 2018 onwards. However, forecasting of 
pharmaceutical expenditure has been undertaken in some 
European regions (e.g. Stockholm), and horizon scanning 
and budgeting activities are also increasing among Euro-
pean countries [6–8]. Some forecasts are also available for 
orphan medicines, where the high cost per patient does 
not necessarily translate into issues of ‘afordability’ [9].
Forecasts are available from commercial organisations, 
with two diferent fundamental methodologies utilised. Most 
common are predictions based on reported sales data from 
pharmaceutical company inancial returns, which extrapolate 
forward based on historical trends. These forecasts tend to 
be global in perspective, as many companies do not report 
sales data split out by region. Such forecasts are not particu-
larly informative for European policy makers, as they do not 
relect the diferences in drug markets between Europe, the 
USA, and Asia. In addition, such forecasts may have less 
use if they report sales at ‘list’ prices without considering 
rebates, ‘basket deals’, and discounts (the latter being a com-
mon feature of sales to secondary care organisations).
The other forecast methodology is that applied by IQVIA 
(formerly Quintiles IMS) using its proprietary audited vol-
ume data collected from representative samples of pharma-
cies and hospitals globally. These data are used to provide 
estimates of historical pharmaceutical expenditure at the 
country, region, and global level and to forecast future trends 
in market growth [10]. The most recent (2016) IQVIA fore-
cast for European pharmaceutical expenditure growth pre-
dicts a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of between 
1 and 4% across EU5 countries between 2016 and 2021 [5, 
11].
While IQVIA data are considered robust and are used by 
commercial, governmental, and academic researchers, cer-
tain aspects of the methodology may afect policy makers’ 
interpretations of the estimates. One consideration is that 
IQVIA forecasts include pharmaceutical expenditure by both 
public (reimbursed) and private (out of pocket, private insur-
ance) sources, whereas policy makers are primarily inter-
ested in the former. More importantly, the IQVIA methodol-
ogy (described in more detail in Sect. 2) estimates historical 
and future expenditure using ‘list’ (also referred to ‘oicial’) 
prices (net of published discounts), which do not relect 
conidential discounts and rebates (‘discounts’) provided 
to public healthcare systems by manufacturers, especially 
for new medicines used in the hospital setting (rather than 
dispensed by retail pharmacists) [12–14]. Broadly speak-
ing, two types of discounts are most commonly applied: (1) 
discounts or agreements at the product level, which may be 
negotiated by national, regional, or local payers; (2) rebates 
at the industry level, whereby manufacturers retrospectively 
pay back money to national payers when total pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure exceeds a certain threshold. As mentioned 
in the following, the level of discounts for some agreements 
are publicly available, albeit in aggregate.
The existence of such discounts has potentially impor-
tant implications for policy makers. Historical and future 
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estimates of pharmaceutical expenditure that are based on 
list prices, rather than net prices, will overstate aggregate 
pharmaceutical expenditure and its proportion of overall 
healthcare expenditure. Equally, if the magnitude of dis-
counts is changing over time, excluding these from forecasts 
will also afect the predicted growth rate of future pharma-
ceutical expenditure. Discounts may be applied diferently in 
diferent countries or healthcare settings and may be driven 
by diferent mechanisms and incentives in diferent settings.
While many discounts are conidential (hence their exclu-
sion from IQVIA estimates), their prevalence and impor-
tance are believed to have increased in Europe over the last 
decade [15]. Indeed, the use of such agreements may in part 
explain the decline in relative pharmaceutical expenditure 
observed by the OECD between 2008 and 2015—noting 
the caveats around OECD data as mentioned and that most 
discounting takes place at the hospital level, which is not 
included in OECD data. This is in addition to substantial 
savings made during this period when several standard med-
icines lost their patents, including atorvastatin, clopidogrel, 
and esomeprazole, as well as various angiotensin receptor 
blockers and atypical antipsychotics. The increase in the use 
of discounts has been driven by increasing price pressures 
and international reference pricing systems [16] that incen-
tivise manufacturers to negotiate conidential agreements 
that do not afect list prices [15].
A factor that may inluence pharmaceutical prices and 
level of discounts are patient access agreements that are 
based on achievement of a mutually agreed treatment out-
come (see, for instance, Jommi [17], Adamski et al. [18], 
Pauwels et al. [19] and Clopes et al. [20]). Whilst these 
agreements may be conidential, restricted at present to cer-
tain speciic treatment and health problems, and have a pro-
portionately small impact on pharmaceutical expenditure, it 
is important to acknowledge that the impact could be greater 
if some countries increase their use of these schemes.
Against this context, the objective of this study was to 
estimate future pharmaceutical expenditure growth rates 
in France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK (EU5) at net 
prices by adjusting the established IQVIA analysis (‘list 
forecast’) for discounts that are not currently incorporated 
(‘net forecast’). In doing so, the paper aims to provide more 
realistic expectations of pharmaceutical expenditure for all 
key stakeholder groups. Adjustments were made to the list 
forecast as follows:
• Historical estimates of pharmaceutical expenditure from 
2010 to 2016 (‘historical list estimate’) were adjusted to 
relect discounts not previously considered (‘historical 
net estimate’).
• Forecasts of future expenditure from 2017 to 2021 were 
re-run using the adjusted historical data to derive the net 
forecast.
The focus of the analysis was the EU5 countries individu-
ally and in aggregate, as they contribute appreciably to the 
overall expenditure of medicines in Europe. An example of 
the type of sensitivity analyses that could be performed is 
also provided (impact of biosimilars).
2  Methods
We followed a four-step approach, as depicted in Fig. 1. 
Our starting point (‘1’ in Fig. 1) was the IQVIA historical 
list estimates of pharmaceutical expenditure (2010–2016), 
which are the basis for the list forecasts of future expenditure 
(2017–2021) (‘2’ in Fig. 1). We then estimated the discounts 
that historically have been observed in each country and that 
are not included in the historical list estimates to create the 
historical net estimates (‘3’ in Fig. 1). Finally, we adjusted 
the list forecast for each country to relect the historical net 
estimates to arrive at a net forecast (‘4’ in Fig. 1).
2.1  Step 1: Historical List Estimate (2010–2016)
Our starting point was IQVIA’s data and forecasts, which 
we revised accordingly. IQVIA  MIDAS® data are volume 
based, tracking virtually every medicine through retail and 
non-retail channels, with oicial, non-conidential prices 
applied at pack level to assess value spend [11, 21]. Price 
data are captured at diferent points in the supply chain 
by market, e.g. pharmacy selling price, wholesaler price, 
Fig. 1  Methodological 
approach. Numbers in circles 
indicate steps—see main text 
for explanation. Rx medicines 
that require a prescription
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ex-manufacturer price. However, country-speciic mark-ups 
are used to relect price at the publicly available ex-manu-
facturer level.
IQVIA data capture expenditure on medicines that require 
a prescription (labelled as Rx), as well as those that do not 
(non-Rx). Rx expenditure represents the majority of sales 
value, given the high levels of reimbursement across EU5 
markets—ranging between 87% in France and 97% in the 
UK (IQVIA data on ile). The value split between Rx and 
non-Rx has remained mostly stable over the last 10 years. It 
should be noted that we are interested in total pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure and thus do not report the expenditure on 
branded medicines and generics separately. However, given 
the future importance of biosimilars, we report the impact 
of some sensitivity analysis around biosimilar uptake and 
price competition.
2.2  Step 2: List Forecast (2017–2021)
IQVIA’s country-speciic forecasts combine historical sales 
data, macroeconomic indicators, and expected events (e.g. 
new product launches) to estimate future pharmaceutical 
expenditure [11, 21]. First, historical volume and price data 
are analysed and plotted. Second, baseline projections are 
developed using exponential smoothing techniques to repre-
sent the extrapolation of underlying conditions. Third, events 
are assessed, quantiied, and applied to baseline projections. 
Events can include major new product launches (informed 
by IQVIA LifeCycle R&D Focus, a global database covering 
more than 31,000 medicines in research or development), 
generic competition, and legislative/policy change (among 
others). Macroeconomic trends are based on econometric 
modelling from the Economist Intelligence Unit. For each 
event, the date, probability of occurrence, time to impact, 
and level of impact are assessed and modelled, drawing on 
analogue analysis (i.e. based on past experience in other 
therapeutic areas) and interviews with market experts.
The baseline forecast is reined and adjusted with inter-
nal expertise and insight within each country. This is sup-
plemented with extensive primary and secondary research 
among all key stakeholders in the industry, including gov-
ernment representatives, regulatory authorities, key opinion 
leaders, specialists, physicians, pharmacists, pharmaceutical 
companies and wholesalers.
2.3  Step 3: Historical Net Estimate (2010–2016)
IQVIA data use publicly available prices. These can relect 
the real cost to public payers in some cases, but further 
discounts also exist in many situations. As previously dis-
cussed, a range of (complex) mechanisms now impact net 
pharmaceutical expenditure. Step 3 was to adjust the his-
torical list estimate to relect these discounts and derive the 
historical net estimates.
Table 1 describes the most important discount mecha-
nisms across the five countries and whether they were 
already accounted for within the IQVIA list forecast. These 
include discounts at the national level agreed between indi-
vidual manufacturers (or industry collectively) and govern-
ment agencies and agreements at the regional or hospital 
level, usually on a product basis.
At the national level, four countries have some form of 
national rebate, whereby a cap is set on total pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure and rebates are paid by industry collectively 
if the limit is exceeded. These limits may take the form of 
agreed growth rates for a speciic period (e.g. 2014–2018 
for branded medicines in the UK, via the Pharmaceutical 
Price Regulation Scheme [PPRS]), linking pharmaceutical 
expenditure growth rate to gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate (Spain), or allocating a maximum percentage 
Table 1  Discount mechanisms in EU5. Adjustments to ‘list’ pharmaceutical expenditure in EU5 (and not included in IQVIA model)
France Germany Italy Spain UK
QI Adj QI Adj QI Adj QI Adj QI Adj
Industry 
rebates
Mandatory 
discounts in 
SHI
Industry rebates Industry rebates PPRS industry 
rebates
Clawback 
payments
Mandatory 
discounts
Compulsory 
paybacks
Paent access 
schemes (NICE)
~
MEAs (e.g. 
pay for 
performance, 
etc.)
AMNOG price 
reducon
Product-level 
discounts
Product-level 
discounts
Naonal 
tenders/contractua
l agreements
~
Sick fund 
clawbacks
MEAs + PVAs Negoated 
discounts
Tenders/disco
unts
Tenders/disco
unts
Tenders/discounts Tenders/discounts Tenders/discounts ~
Rebates Rebates Rebates Rebates Rebates ~
Light grey shading indicates the national level; the regional/hospital level is not shaded
Adj adjusted forecast, AMNOG Arzneimittelmarkt-Neuordnungsgesetz, MEA managed entry agreement, NICE National Institute for Health and 
Care Excellence, PPRS Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme, PVAs price-volume agreements, QI QI forecast, SHI statutory health insurance
᪦ indicates included in forecast, ᪪ indicates excluded in forecast, ~ indicates in the UK, those factors were adjusted only for the PPRS part of the 
market
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of public healthcare expenditure (Italy). Other national-
level agreements include mandatory discounts applied 
across a particular drug class (e.g. discounts applied to 
retail medicines in Germany) and product-speciic coni-
dential discounts that are negotiated with national payer 
agencies at the time of launch (e.g. the Italian Medicines 
Agency [AIFA] in Italy and the Ministry of Health in Spain). 
These national product-speciic discounts also encompass 
more complex managed entry agreements (MEAs); these 
could be inancial-based, such as most of the Patient Access 
Schemes used by the National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence (NICE), the All Wales Medicines Strategy Group 
(AWMSG), and the Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) 
in the UK, or outcome-based agreements, such as the pay-
ment-by-results schemes used by AIFA in Italy.
At the local level, product-speciic discounts are often 
negotiated by regional payer bodies, hospitals networks, and 
individual hospitals. Tenders, which are sometimes used at 
the national level, are commonly used at the local level and 
tend to apply to a speciic part of the market, either high-
usage products, hospital-only medicines, or generics dis-
pensed in primary care [22, 23]. A signiicant part of the 
discounting takes place at the hospital level as a result of 
conidential contracting between companies and individual 
hospitals (or groups of hospitals).
At both national and local levels, discounts are usually 
conidential, especially for product-speciic agreements. It 
is therefore not possible to adjust the list historical estimates 
or list forecast on a product-by-product basis. Alternative 
approaches were taken to estimate the impact of these dis-
counts, depending upon the data available in each country.
Data with which to inform the adjustments were identi-
ied through two channels: (1) a review of peer-reviewed and 
grey literature, including government agency websites and 
reports, and (2) interviews with health economic experts in 
each of the countries to discuss data sources. Details on the 
data available and the speciic adjustments made for each 
country are summarised in Table 2.
Wherever data were available, list-to-net adjustments 
were made speciic to a particular type of discount. For 
example, in Italy, aggregate data were available on the 
rebates paid by industry at the national level due to exceed-
ing the expenditure cap, rebates paid as a result of product-
level MEAs, and net expenditure after discounts for both 
retail and hospital medicines.
In other countries, such as the UK, it was not possible to 
obtain data on speciic forms of discounts (such as savings 
made as a result of Patient Access Schemes agreed with 
NICE, SMC, and AWMSG as they are conidential [24]). In 
these situations, the diference between list and net expendi-
ture was estimated based on comparing historical aggregate 
net expenditure data from oicial sources with the histori-
cal list expenditure estimates from IQVIA. For the UK, this 
meant using the total net expenditure returns reported by 
the Department of Health as part of the PPRS agreement 
that controls pharmaceutical expenditure for most branded 
medicines in the UK. In Spain, where discount-speciic sav-
ings were also not available, aggregate net expenditure data 
were obtained from reports from the Ministry of Finance and 
Public Administration.
To compare IQVIA historical list estimates with net data 
reported by governments, it was necessary to ensure that 
both estimates included the same types of expenditure (e.g. 
whether over-the-counter medicines were included) and 
costs (e.g. wholesaler or pharmacy margins). Where difer-
ences existed, we adjusted the IQVIA forecast accordingly. 
Notwithstanding, recognising the potential for discrepancies 
in the absolute aggregate estimate of expenditure, the focus 
of this analysis was on change in the size of the list-to-net 
gap over time (growth rate) rather than absolute estimates of 
expenditure. Thus, any form of discount that has remained 
lat in the past will not afect the growth rate of (net) phar-
maceutical expenditure relative to list expenditure, and the 
adjustment is not included in the analysis. This would be a 
conservative assumption if those ‘lat’ discounts increase 
in the future.
2.4  Step 4: Net Forecast (2017–2021)
After the derivation of historical net estimates, the IQVIA 
list forecast model was re-run using the revised historical 
data to generate a new net forecast. As described in Step 2, 
the IQVIA list forecast comprises two main components: 
a projection forward based on historical trends combined 
with adjustments for expected ‘events’ (e.g. new product 
launches). The new net forecast relected the revised his-
torical data, while keeping unchanged the adjustments for 
expected events.
3  Results
CAGRs are presented in Table 3 and Fig. 2.
The value of the adjustments (i.e. rebate, discounts) 
increases over time and in doing so also represents an 
increasing share of total (list) expenditure. For instant, for 
EU5 in aggregate, the estimated level of adjustments was €9 
billion (representing 7% of total list pharmaceutical expendi-
ture) in 2014. By 2021, the level is estimated at €27 billion, 
representing 17% of total list expenditure.
3.1  France
Historical list estimates of expenditure in France showed 
low average growth rates of 0.5% CAGR between 2010 and 
2016. Historical net growth estimates were derived from 
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French government returns (net of discounts), which were 
further adjusted to relect rebates and payback agreements 
with manufacturers. Historical net data showed a small 
decline in pharmaceutical expenditure of − 0.4% CAGR over 
this period. The impact of including discounts is of nearly 
1% point over the 7 years, which is signiicant.
Expenditure in the French retail sector fell with the imple-
mentation of cost-control methods, loss of exclusivity of 
major products and generic entry, and some shift towards 
hospital expenditure. Hospital expenditure is also largely 
controlled at the list price level, with growth remaining rela-
tively slow despite the launch of high-budget-impact hepa-
titis C virus (HCV) products in recent years.
Health authorities in France actively manage aggregate 
pharmaceutical expenditure against annual targets and utilise 
payback agreements and price cuts to control growth. For 
example, paybacks by industry doubled from €520 million 
in 2014 to €1020 million in 2015 [25].
The list forecast for France was 1.8% CAGR between 
2017 and 2021, which fell to 0.6% in the net forecast—an 
impact of over 1% point. By 2021, the level of discounting 
(as a result of manufacturers’ paybacks in the hospital sec-
tor) is estimated to represent 12% of total list pharmaceutical 
spend in that country, which is the lowest across the ive 
countries. Given that the Comité Économique des Produits 
de Santé (CEPS) has publicly stated a target of €1 billion 
reduction in aggregate pharmaceutical expenditure in 2018, 
growth could in fact be lower than this [53].
3.2  Germany
The retail segment is dominant in Germany (86% of mar-
ket), with many ‘hospital-type’ treatments delivered through 
oice-based physicians (IQVIA data on ile). According to 
the historical list estimates, total market and retail expendi-
ture have both been growing historically at around 4% 
CAGR. Arzneimittelmarkt-Neuordnungsgesetz (AMNOG) 
rebates, which are publicly visible, are already captured 
in the historical list estimate and list forecast, but as more 
products become subject to them over time, the impact on 
total expenditure has increased (partly accounting for a 
lower list forecast growth rate of 3.2% compared with his-
torical growth rate). Two mechanisms substantially reduce 
net expenditure estimates: the mandatory discounts applied 
to retail products and the sick fund clawbacks (rebates paid 
because of negotiated contractual agreements—noting 
that individual agreements are conidential, but the overall 
SHI impact is published yearly, which we have used in our 
analysis). The former (mandatory rebates) have luctuated 
between 6 and 16% since 2010 [30]. The latter (clawback 
payments) increased threefold over 7 years, from €1310 mil-
lion in 2010 to €3890 million in 2016 [28, 34].
Overall, the efect in Germany is to reduce the net fore-
cast CAGR for 2017–2021 from 3.2 to 2.0%. By 2021, the 
level of discounting is estimated to represent 18% of total 
list pharmaceutical spend in that country, which is similar to 
the EU5 average. The efects of the mandatory discounts and 
the paybacks can be separated historically; the importance of 
the mandatory discount was higher than the payback system, 
although by 2015 its weight decreased to 60% of the total 
adjustment. For the forecast, the efect of both adjustments 
is aggregated, but the increase is driven by the increased SHI 
clawbacks, as mentioned.
3.3  Italy
Historical estimates of pharmaceutical expenditure in Italy 
from 2010 to 2016 were 4.5% (list) and 2.8% (net). Italian 
retail sector pharmaceutical sales have been falling since 
2010, with overall market growth attributed to the hospital 
sector. This is due partly to a shift towards new product 
launches in specialty medicines and partly to the increas-
ing role taken by hospitals in procuring medicines used 
outside of hospitals [54]. These medicines are distributed 
either directly by hospitals (e.g. new medicines for HCV) or 
by community pharmacies on behalf of hospitals (e.g. new 
oral antidiabetic medicines). The gap between list and net 
Table 3  EU5 aggregate and country-speciic data: list/net pharmaceu-
tical expenditure compound annual growth rates (2010–2021)
CAGRs compound annual growth rates, NC could not be calculated 
because of lack of data
CAGR (%)
List Net
France
 Historical (2010–2016) 0.5 − 0.4
 Forecast (2017–2021) 1.8 0.6
Germany
 Historical (2010–2016) 3.9 2.5
 Forecast (2017–2021) 3.2 2.0
Italy
 Historical (2010–2016) 4.5 2.8
 Forecast (2017–2021) 3.2 1.1
Spain
 Historical (2010–2016) 2.2 NC
 Historical (2014–2016) 9.4 4.8
 Forecast (2017–2021) 2.5 1.1
UK
 Historical (2010–2016) 6.8 NC
 Historical (2013–2016) 7.9 4.3
 Forecast (2017–2021) 3.8 2.3
EU5
 Historical (2010–2016) 3.4 2.0
 Forecast (2017–2021) 2.9 1.5
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estimates increased from 2014 to 2016—at a time when both 
were growing faster than the historical trend—as a conse-
quence of a sharp increase in savings related to deals agreed 
with manufacturers of HCV medicines.
The most important discounts in the Italian system that 
are not already captured in the historical list estimate (the 
historical list estimates include a 9.75% binding discount 
over list prices applied to all medicines, excluding the ‘inno-
vative’ ones) are as follows:
1. Industry-level payback based on level of hospital and 
outpatient pharmaceutical public expenditure as propor-
tion of total health public expenditure; the actual pay-
back was estimated at 1.6% of total gross expenditure 
Fig. 2  Historical and forecast pharmaceutical expenditure at list and net prices. CAGR compound annual growth rate
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for reimbursed medicines between 2013 and 2016 [55]. 
These apply to all class reimbursed medicines (orphan 
and innovative drug manufacturers are exempt from pay-
ing).1
2. Discounts negotiated with AIFA and at hospital level, 
which accounted for a list to-net diference of 8% of 
total public pharmaceutical expenditure on average in 
2009–2016, increasing to 14.2% in 2016.
3. Rebates from inancial-based MEAs mainly for HCV 
medicines that averaged 4.3% of total pharmaceutical 
expenditure between 2015 and 2016, and outcome-based 
MEAs for cancer drugs medicines that averaged 0.3% 
(2014–2016).
Overall, the forecast CAGR for 2017–2021 reduced from 
3.2% (list) to 1.1% (net); this is the biggest decrease in per-
centage points of the ive countries. Indeed, by 2021, the 
level of discounting is estimated to represent 21% of total list 
pharmaceutical spend in that country, which is the highest 
across the ive countries. Two adjustments were modelled: 
the discounts in hospital from managed entry agreements 
and industry-level payback, where total pharmaceutical 
expenditure caps are exceeded, which are expected to rise, 
and rebates for HCV medicines, which are expected to 
decline.
3.4  Spain
Historical list estimates of pharmaceutical expenditure 
growth in Spain were 2.2% CAGR between 2010 and 2016. 
However, growth declined between 2010 and 2014 and then 
increased on the back of expenditure on HCV medicines 
(between 2014 and 2016, growth at list prices was 9.4%).
Retail sector sales have been falling since 2010 in Spain, 
with most growth attributed to the hospital sector due to 
oncology costs and short-term expenditure on HCV medi-
cines (Spain has particularly high HCV prevalence). In the 
retail setting, compulsory paybacks came in force in 2006 
(Law 29/2006) [56]. The pharmaceutical industry pays 
money back every 4 months to research institutes (via the 
Institute Carlos III) and to the government to fund policies 
encouraging healthcare cohesion across Spain and educa-
tion programmes for healthcare professionals, among oth-
ers, expressed as a percentage of sales [57]. Such payments 
are not captured in the historical list estimates, although, as 
they have remained lat (1.5–2%) since their introduction 
in 2006, they do not contribute to any divergence in the list 
and net forecast.
Mandatory discounts applied to invoices for all hospital 
medicines (7.5%; 4% for orphan medicines) have been in 
place since 2010 [56]. Increasing use of hospital products 
means these savings are forecasted to increase. In addition, 
a dual pricing system is in place for hospital medicines: the 
list price (‘precio notiicado’)—which is the oicial price for 
international price referencing—and the reimbursed price 
(‘precio facturación’). The list price is published, but the 
reimbursement price is conidential.
Historical net expenditure data for hospital sales were 
available from 2014 to 2016 (during this period, HCV medi-
cines were launched in Spain). These data are published by 
the Ministry of Finance,2 and the diference between net 
expenditure on hospital medicines versus aggregate expendi-
ture at list prices was 22%, 28%, and 34% for 2014, 2015, 
and 2016, respectively [58]. The Ministry of Finance also 
publishes net expenditure in primary care, but we did not 
compare this data with IQVIA’s as we felt IQVIA data cap-
tured an important part of the discounts.
In 2015, a Stability Pact was signed between the Minis-
try of Health and the research-based pharmaceutical trade 
association, Farmaindustria, on behalf of industry [58]. 
This pact links pharmaceutical expenditure growth to GDP 
growth; over and above this level of growth, the industry is 
required to pay back the diference. These limits have not 
been reached since their introduction because pharmaceu-
tical expenditure growth fell below GDP growth over this 
1 Regulation of spending caps on drugs has changed many times. In 
2001 (law n. 405/2001), a spending cap on drugs used outside hospi-
tals, named ‘Spesa farmaceutica territoriale’ (retail sector and drugs 
procured by hospitals and used outside hospitals) was introduced. 
The spending cap was set at 13% of overall public health expendi-
ture. This legislation was amended in 2008 (law n. 222/2007): the 
spending cap on Spesa farmaceutica territoriale (including patient 
co-payments set at regional level) was determined as the 14.0% 
ceiling of the overall public health expenditure at both national and 
regional levels, whereas the hospital (in-patient) budget for pharma-
ceutical expenditure (named ‘Spesa farmaceutica ospedaliera’) could 
not exceed a 2.40% ceiling of the overall public health expenditure. 
If the budget of the Spesa farmaceutica territoriale was overrun, the 
industry and the distribution would have been required to cover the 
full deicit. Since 2013 (law n. 135/2012), the industry was asked to 
cover 50% of the Spesa farmaceutica ospedaliera budget deicit (the 
budget was raised to 3% of overall public health expenditure, whereas 
the budget for the Spesa farmaceutica territoriale was lowered to 
11.35%). The spending caps have changed again since 2017, set as 
7.96 and 6.89% of the overall public health expenditure for retail 
drugs and all drugs procured by hospitals, respectively.
2 In December 2017, the Spanish Ministry of Health started publish-
ing net costs of medicines used in public hospitals, including dis-
counts. However, the two datasets do not coincide, and diferences 
are especially big for Valencia and Catalonia (https ://www.diari ofarm 
a.com/2017/12/04/compa rable -gasto -hospi talar io-publi ca-sanid ad-
hacie nda). The main reason behind the diferences is they are meas-
uring two diferent things and are thus not comparable. Our analysis 
uses the Ministry of Finance data, and it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to analyse the diferences between the two diferent datasets.
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period [58]. However, this legislation could act as an upper 
limit on future growth.
After adjusting the historical list estimate for the observed 
diference with the Ministry of Finance net data for hospital 
pharmaceutical expenditures, the net forecast for 2017–2021 
was 1.1 versus 2.5% under the list forecast. By 2021, the 
level of discounting is estimated to represent 20% of total list 
pharmaceutical spend in Spain, where the diference in this 
case is due to the discounts in the hospital sector, estimated 
as the gap between list and net expenditure.
3.5  UK
In the UK, the historical list estimate of expenditure growth 
was 6.8% CAGR between 2010 and 2016. At the time of 
data analysis, publicly available historical net expenditure 
data were available from 2013 to 2017 and only included the 
51% of the UK drug market covered by the PPRS [48–52]. 
The PPRS is estimated to cover 80% of branded medicines 
by value. No adjustments were made to account for coni-
dential discounts and rebates in the non-PPRS market, which 
includes generics and HCV expenditure on products mar-
keted by Gilead (which, as of December 2017, was not a 
member of the PPRS). Given that these products are likely 
to be subject to discounts of a similar magnitude to PPRS 
products, the adjustment in the UK is likely to be under-
representative of the true list-to-net diference and to over-
estimate growth rates. We are aware there is a pharmacy 
clawback based on rebates from manufacturers/wholesalers; 
this has been constant under the historic period so would 
not afect the growth rate.3 This clawback is not modelled.
The unadjusted forecast is 3.8% CAGR for the period 
2017–2021; the net forecast decreases to 2.3%. By 2021, the 
level of discounting is estimated to represent 17% of total list 
pharmaceutical spend in that country, which is equal to the 
EU5 average—as mentioned, there is only one adjustment 
for the UK (PPRS net sales after rebates).
3.6  EU5
When the forecasts for the ive countries are aggregated, the 
EU5 (unweighted) average historical growth rate falls from 
3.4% at list to 2.5% at net. For the forecast, the net growth 
rate is estimated at 1.5% CAGR versus 2.9% at list.
3.7  Some Sensitivity Analysis: Impact of Biosimilars
We did not undertake sensitivity analyses, although we 
illustrate with the case of biosimilars the sort of analyses 
that could be done. We pick biosimilars given the number 
and size of biologics that will lose patent protection in the 
coming years, as the evolution of the market for biosimilars 
will be an important variable impacting future expenditure 
growth rates [59]. Three key variables afect biosimilar 
impact: speed of entry, uptake, and degree of price competi-
tion (linked to the number of biosimilars, but also with origi-
nators). The assumption in the IQVIA list forecast is that the 
size of price reductions at the point of loss of exclusivity 
in future will be of the same magnitude as those observed 
historically since the introduction of biosimilars. This could 
be an underestimate of future biologic value erosion, as the 
biosimilar market is still developing, and greater competi-
tion is expected as it matures. Across the EU5 countries, 
€30–40 billion of cumulative sales can be exposed to bio-
similar competition through 2021 (IQVIA data on ile). If 
biosimilars lead to value erosion that is closer to that seen 
for small molecules, overall future net growth rates in the 
EU5 based on this analysis would be nearer to 0.5–1% over 
the next 5 years, rather than the 1.5%. However, this will 
depend on greater uptake of biosimilars than currently seen 
through educational and other activities, including the col-
lection of high-quality comprehensive outcomes data on 
the efectiveness and safety of biosimilars and originator 
products [59–61].
4  Discussion
The results from this study suggest that future growth in 
pharmaceutical expenditure in Europe is likely to be lower 
than previously understood from forecasts based on list 
prices. The growth in use of conidential discounts over the 
last decade (such as those badged as patient access schemes, 
e.g. those in the UK and those agreed locally or regionally), 
especially for cancer medicines, which are usually used in 
the hospital setting (e.g. see Pauwels et al. [13]), has led to 
increased divergence between list and net prices, with the 
associated overstatement of historical expenditure levels. 
One possible reason for this is the increased use of external 
reference pricing, where prices across countries are interde-
pendent; thus, there are incentives to keep these discounts 
conidential. However, this way of regulating medicines 
prices was recently criticised because of its negative efects 
[62]. Another factor that can impact the size of the rebates 
are ‘product events’. For example, in the period 2015 and 
2016, the new generation of HCV medicines were intro-
duced and, in some markets (such as Italy), were sold with 
very substantial rebates that momentarily boosted the rebate 
and created an unreliable trend. However, industry-level pay-
back because of drug budget overrun is expected to increase, 
and, incorporating this efect, the divergent trend of list and 
net expenditure is expected to be conirmed. It is also pos-
sible, but maybe less so, that rebates/adjustments would 3 We thank one of the reviewers for pointing this out.
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decrease over time and, thus, net expenditure growth would 
be higher than list expenditure.
The historical and forecast net-price adjustments pre-
sented in this paper relect that divergence as closely as the 
publicly available data allow, but the conidential nature 
of these arrangements mean they are inherently diicult to 
quantify. Not all conidential discounts or rebates have been 
captured for every country. For example, in the UK, net data 
were only available for approximately half of the UK market 
by value (medicines covered by PPRS). This analysis also 
relied upon published net expenditure data reported at the 
national level. Rebates paid to hospitals and regional health 
authorities are not fully captured in all countries. This is 
certainly the main limitation of the paper; however, we are 
not aware of any other sources that will ill the existing infor-
mation gaps on the level of discounting. One possible further 
avenue could be to undertake (conidential) surveys/inter-
views with various payers in these countries, or with phar-
maceutical companies. Interaction with payers could also be 
used to validate our results. Moreover, unknown rebates have 
been assumed constant and thus do not impact the growth 
rate; however, they would have impacted the net value.
This analysis was based on an IQVIA forecast, which is 
considered one of the most established analyses of pharma-
ceutical expenditure and beneits from the comprehensive 
country-speciic data collected by IQVIA. However, as with 
all modelling exercises, the IQVIA forecasting methodol-
ogy incorporates assumptions about future events—such 
as new drug launches and socioeconomic developments—
that are fundamentally uncertain. Nevertheless, knowing 
the current research and development pipeline of potential 
new medicines and the loss of exclusivity dates of existing 
medicines provides as accurate an estimate as possible of 
how medicines expenditure may change in the future. The 
adjustments to the IQVIA forecast for future years were esti-
mated based on the trend in diferences between list and net 
observed historically; if the level of discounts and rebates 
changes in future, this prediction may not be accurate. Future 
research could undertake sensitivity analyses to understand 
the impact of various events on both the expected growth 
rate and the increased/decreased divergence between list and 
net expenditure.
No other European net price forecasts were identiied that 
could be used to validate the future estimates from this anal-
ysis. However, the historical adjustments can be compared 
with OECD data (Fig. 3), which shows net pharmaceuti-
cal expenditure as lat or falling as a proportion of health-
care expenditure in EU5 countries between 2010 and 2018 
(most recent data available) [3]. These data provide some 
context to our results, but the diferences between IQVIA 
and OECD data should be noted. Broadly speaking, these are 
that (1) OECD numbers are at sell-out price and IQVIA at 
ex-manufacturing price (the diferences are wholesaler and 
pharmacy margins and dispensing fees); (2) OECD numbers 
can capture patient co-payments as part of expenditure, but 
these are not included for IQVIA expenditure; (3) OECD 
numbers are based on country reporting, and countries, for 
diferent reasons, might not always follow the OECD guide-
lines, which means the numbers may be over- or understated; 
and (4) hospital data are incomplete for some countries.
In the USA, a similar analysis was performed to explore 
the impact of discounts on total expenditure [63]. This study 
estimated that, between 2005 and 2012, manufacturers’ dis-
counts and rebates reduced expenditure on branded medi-
cines by approximately 18% each year. However, between 
2010 and 2014, the discounts and rebates increased from 18 
to 28% of total expenditure on brand-name medicines. This 
growing divergence between list and net prices in the USA 
relects the similar trend we observed in Europe. Unlike our 
own study, Aitken et al. [63] did not forecast the implications 
for future pharmaceutical expenditure growth in the USA.
It is beyond the scope of our study to explore the driv-
ers of growth in pharmaceutical expenditure, as this is a 
complex issue. However, we can observe mixed positive 
and negative efects. On one hand, prescribed volumes for 
medicines to treat non-communicable diseases, such as dia-
betes, hypercholesterolaemia, hypertension, and acid-related 
stomach disorders, have appreciably increased in recent 
Fig. 3  Pharmaceutical 
expenditure as a percentage of 
healthcare expenditure in EU5 
countries, 2010–2015 (Organi-
sation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development data on 
pharmaceutical expenditure)
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years, with volumes rising several-fold among countries 
[64–66]. For instance, and according to AIFA estimates, 
most of the increase of the pharmaceutical retail market is 
due to an increase in volumes [67]. This is coupled with 
a shift towards more expensive medicines in the hospital 
setting as new innovative medicines are launched in areas 
of high unmet need. On the other hand, and as mentioned 
in Sect. 1, cheaper generics in many large therapeutic areas 
have entered the market, generating signiicant savings to 
third-party payers (i.e. see European Assessment [68]). As 
mentioned, one area with more uncertainty is the impact of 
biosimilars in the future.
Aitken [69] analysed the evolution of pharmaceutical 
expenditure in ive countries, including France, Germany, 
and the UK, over 20 years. Among other things, he showed 
that pharmaceutical expenditure growth has been roughly 
in line with increases in total health expenditure. Indeed, 
our projections, after taking into account adjustments, are 
below predicted healthcare expenditure growth in Europe 
and in line with long-term economic growth rates [70, 
71]. Understanding the dynamics of the market in the past 
is always an important element in driving the forecasts. 
For policy makers concerned about the sustainability of 
pharmaceutical expenditure, this study may provide some 
comfort, in that the perceived problem is not as large as 
expected. While there is debate to be had about the merits 
of non-transparent discounts and rebates, they appear to be 
playing an important role in containing the growth of real 
pharmaceutical expenditure whilst allowing reimbursement 
and funding for new medicines that would not have been 
possible without such schemes. The results of this analysis 
suggest that healthcare payers maintain considerable control 
over pharmaceutical expenditure and have been efective in 
managing growth historically. Even the introduction of new 
HCV medicines, which prompted a very public debate about 
pharmaceutical expenditure sustainability [72, 73], appear 
to have led to only a temporary uptick in the growth rate, 
mitigated by negotiated discounts and rebates (especially as 
a result of competition between diferent medicines), after 
which the growth trajectory quickly reverted to the histori-
cal average.
5  Conclusion
The increasing frequency and magnitude of conidential 
discounts, including MEAs, rebates, and discounts, have 
led to a growing divergence between list and net prices for 
medicines in Europe. This is driven by increasing inancial 
pressures within health systems, policies such as external 
reference pricing, and a shift in pharmaceutical innovation 
from retail to hospital settings with most new medicines for 
immunological and cancer conditions in many countries. It 
is beyond the remit of our article to compare the expenditure 
in pharmaceuticals with the outcomes achieved from their 
use, as this is a complex task.
After adjusting for discounts and rebates, net expenditure 
growth in EU5 is predicted to be approximately 1.5% CAGR 
over the next 5 years. This is below predicted healthcare 
expenditure growth in Europe and in line with long-term 
economic growth rates.
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